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I. Introduction: Conatus and the permanence of meaning
In this essay, I investigate ‘conatus’ as the ‘will to persist’ of an individual as part of a (cultural) collective. Moving beyond an understanding of a ‘will to persist’ as the common aspect of all animate entities by which 
they strive to stay alive (sometimes referred to as a ‘vitalist’ understanding), 
I focus on ‘conatus’ as an aspect of the permanence of meaning constitutive 
of human society and culture. Current philosophical anthropologies explain 
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the transcendental conditions of human existence1 with reference to different 
interpretations of the ‘conative’ aspect in this second sense, and this is their 
foremost task.2 My thesis is that the specific difference of the conative strife 
in human beings manifests itself as the quest for a permanence of meaning.
I would like to put into comparative perspective the multi-layered and 
understudied concept of strife as it can be found in three canonical texts 
which are rarely read side-by-side or under this aspect: Plato’s Symposium, 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Scheler’s Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. 
Such a comparative reading, should it be fruitful, at all, must avoid several 
dangers. Applying the concept ‘conatus’ must avoid anachronisms; it cannot 
lightheartedly be applied in the three authors. Then, there is the limit of time 
and patience (in the reader), which puts a full stop to the material which can 
be covered in the space of an article. I focus on three conative foundation-
stories, the myth of ‘Eros’ in Plato’s Symposium, the fable of ‘Cura’ in 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, and the term ‘Geist’ in Scheler’s Die Stellung des 
Menschen im Kosmos. They each capture the defining features of the conative 
human striving in the form of a ‘myth’ which prior to a systematic reading 
tells of the origin of human striving and provides a starting point for further 
(ontological) investigation. The present essay explores these different 
concepts of strife as they negotiate the individual’s space in, but also beyond 
contingent existence.
What connects these three and stands out to me is that they describe 
a movement between ‘the erotic’ and ‘the eternal,’ and that this movement 
characterizes human striving. With these three exegetic vignettes, I hope to 
shed light on the transition of the concept ‘conatus,’ from the ancient to 
the contemporary philosophical point of view and illustrate the philosophical 
relevance it might have, today. All three conceptions consider the striving 
of human individuals as not merely going beyond self-preservation. By 
inverting the common understanding of need, these conceptions propose that 
1 Here, I refer mainly to current projects of post-critical philosophical anthropologies (including 
mine) for which Kantian considerations set the stage. See Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Sinn (Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 2011), 43: “In Kants Gegenüberstellung von ‘transzendent’ und ‘transzendental’ geht 
es daher gerade darum, jede Rede über ein solches vermeintes Jenseits immanent zu deuten, also 
auf Formen unserer condition humaine zu beziehen.” (Translation mine; Kant’s confrontation of 
‘transcendent’ with ‘transcendental’ is aimed at interpreting all talk of an alleged hereafter as 
immanent, to relate it to forms of our condition humaine). 
2 Scheler states, for example, that the questions of a philosphical anthropology have gained 
much acclaim, in recent years, but, more importantly, that there is a new readiness to accept 
the possible answers to the question of who man is: “In dem Augenblick, in dem der Mensch 
sich eingestanden hat, daß er weniger als je ein strenges Wissen habe, von dem, was er sei, und 
ihn auch keine Möglichkeit der Antwort auf diese Frage mehr schreckt, schein auch der neue 
Mut der Wahrhaftigkeit in ihn eingekehrt zu sein […].” Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen 
im Kosmos (Berlin: Michael Holzinger, 2016), 6.
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flourishing through striving forms the very foundation of human existence, and 
that this conative ‘essence’ is the point of departure for any comprehensive 
understanding of human existence. 
II. Striving out of need towards knowledge: ‘Eros’ in the Symposium
a. The Myth and its implications 
The origin of human striving, which for the Greeks equals its essence, is described 
by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium through the myth of the personified ‘Eros’ – 
an allegorical rendering of man’s conative essence: ‘Eros,’ a daimon (Geist), is 
the child of ‘Penia,’ whose name means ‘poverty’ or ‘need’ and ‘Poros,’ whose 
name means ‘resourcefulness’ or ‘fullnes.’ At a garden-party of the gods on 
Aphrodite’s birth-day, ‘Penia’ rapes ‘Poros’ and they conceive the child ‘Eros,’ 
who inherits his mother’s and father’s essences. He is suspended between the 
poles ‘fullness of wisdom and resource’ (his father) and ‘void of wisdom and 
resource’ (his mother). ‘Eros’ is forever striving towards perfection born out 
of a lack of it.3 This metaphor, for Socrates, captures the movement (and 
motivation) of a person who lacks love or beauty and is therefore drawn to 
beauty. In this striving, the person thus moved gradually ascends towards the 
final goal, Beauty itself.4 
3 Plato, Symposium (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925). The eros-myth that 
Diotima relates reads as follows: [203b] “‘That is rather a long story,’ she replied, ‘but still, 
I will tell it you. When Aphrodite was born, the gods made a great feast, and among the 
company was Resource the son of Cunning. And when they had banqueted there came Poverty 
abegging, as well she might in an hour of good cheer, and hung about the door. Now Resource, 
grown tipsy with nectar – for wine as yet there was none – went into the garden of Zeus, and 
there, overcome with heaviness, slept. Then Poverty, being of herself so resourceless, devised 
the scheme of having a child by Resource [203c] and lying down by his side she conceived Love. 
Hence it is that Love from the beginning has been attendant and minister to Aphrodite, since he 
was begotten on the day of her birth, and is, moreover, by nature a lover bent on beauty since 
Aphrodite is beautiful. Now, as the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is in a peculiar case. 
First, he is ever poor, and far from tender or beautiful as most suppose him: [203d] rather is he 
hard and parched, shoeless and homeless; on the bare ground always he lies with no bedding, 
and takes his rest on doorsteps and waysides in the open air; true to his mother’s nature, he ever 
dwells with want. But he takes after his father in scheming for all that is beautiful and good; 
for he is brave, strenuous and high-strung, a famous hunter, always weaving some stratagem; 
desirous and competent of wisdom, throughout life ensuing the truth; a master of jugglery, 
witchcraft, [203e] and artful speech. By birth neither immortal nor mortal, in the selfsame day 
he is flourishing and alive at the hour when he is abounding in resource; at another he is dying, 
and then reviving again by force of his father’s nature: yet the resources that he gets will ever 
be ebbing away; so that Love is at no time either resourceless or wealthy, and furthermore, he 
stands midway betwixt wisdom and ignorance […].”
4 Songe-Møller discusses Plato’s choice of Diotima as ‘teacher’ of Socrates; she is herself 
‘wise,’ that is: she is not striving for truth guided by the homo-erotic ‘eros;’ her identity as 
an old woman places her beyond the hetero-sexual ‘Eros’ of procreation; yet, her identity 
as a gyni makes her more of an expert in questions relating to child bearing and birth. Vidgis 
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“Now then,” said Socrates, “let us agree to what we have so far 
concluded. First, is not Love directed to certain things of which, 
in the second place, he has a want?”5
We must keep in mind that the previous speakers, although dismissed and 
corrected by Socrates, contribute to the overall picture Plato presents to us. 
From this emerges that what is wanting to man is this – unchanging oneness 
(it is also called: Truth, Beauty, the Good). The goal of ‘Eros’ (the second topic 
Socrates wants to discuss, after discussing the origin and essence of ‘Eros’) is to 
lead man away from simple gratification of the carnal desires towards seeing 
Beauty and Truth; this can be achieved “by loving boys correctly,” for it is the 
homoerotic ‘eros’ which leads along this path.6 The erotic strife does not refer 
to biological reproduction. Philosophical Love (the homoerotic ‘eros’) describes 
the conative as a striving for beautiful ideas or Beauty (Truth) itself – the erotic 
moves towards the eternal. 
The persistence of man (as a species and as partaker of truth) is seen as an 
individual’s endeavor. Man might ‘use’ a woman to sire his child and he might 
‘use’ another man (or boy) to move towards Truth. The homoerotic ‘Eros’ allows 
him to appreciate beauty in the other (as likeness), then move on to Beauty 
itself, leaving the lover behind. In this conception, birth and reproduction can 
be instantiated in three different ways, each of which is but continuation of 
sameness: the maintenance of one’s body by cell-reproduction, the continued 
existence of the human kind from generation to generation by way of ‘copying’ 
oneself in a child, and the realization of the eternal by parturition of true ideas 
(the last being the only way in which men can glimpse immortality proper). 
b. Impossible difference – Receiving a feminist critique 
The Symposium accounts for erotic strife as a striving for immortality (permanence, 
continued existence). Songe-Møller reads this ‘Eros’-myth with the aim of a 
feminist critique. Her critique is first and foremost a critique on the exclusion of the 
feminine; more generally, it can be seen as the exclusion of difference. Departing 
from her critique, I maintain that the erotic strive for truth does not necessarily 
deny a substantial role to women in particular (as long as they participate ‘as 
men’), but paradoxically it does deny a role to all individuals as individuals7:
Songe-Møller, Philosophy without Women – The Birth of Sexism in Western Thought (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 105.
5 Plato, Symposium, 200e.
6 Ibid., 211b.
7 Setting as highest goal the Sameness or Unity symbolized, for example, also in the circle 
which forms the Greek polis of equal citizens; see Songe-Møller, Chapter 3 ‘The Logic of 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:04 |
[ 217 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2 • 2021
i. Reproduction beyond sexual difference to the exclusion of the possibility 
of the feminine:
My aim in describing the love discourse of the Symposium in these 
terms has been to show how the kind of metaphoric language 
that Plato uses in this text – images relating to sexuality and birth 
– facilitate a particular understanding of philosophy: philosophy 
as the highest form of reproduction – the reproduction of the 
One and of Likeness – with immortality as its objective and a 
radical homo-eroticism as its precondition.8 
Attributing a more perfect form of reproduction to men and equipping 
‘Eros’ with both male and female attributes not only moves towards a one-
sex solution, but also takes away from the only way in which women are 
perceived in the first place – as gynaikes, that is: women in the biological 
sense of sexual reproduction.9 One result of the Symposium in this reading 
is the (functional) devaluation of the female qua description of a male birth 
(of ideas). In the Symposium, according to Songe-Møller, Plato presents an 
account of a masculine birth, a birth only possible through homo-eroticism 
which allows for ‘loving the same:’ “The attraction is that of what resembles 
oneself, or more accurately, of what resembles one’s own ideal.”10
From an intellectual standpoint, writes Songe-Møller, Socrates could 
also have written about ‘Eros’ as a female figure, promoting love between 
the same sex as between women.11 Or he could have opted for describing 
the highest love as a spiritualized union between the two sexes. The latter 
is an unlikely candidate because the union of the sexes, as we have seen, 
naturally results in biological procreation and as such necessarily ends in the 
consumption of carnal desire, not being suited to point towards anything 
beyond itself. The former is disregarded because women are variously 
described as feeble-minded (along with slaves and children) and only the 
most masculine women can become ‘men’ in their own right (and only if they 
dress up and ‘act’ as men), that is: they can participate only if and as long as 
they negate their femininity. Beyond observing that every declared identity 
Exclusion and the Free Men’s Democracy.’
8 Ibid., 112.
9 “Phaedrus begins, since he is, as we are told, ‘father of the thought.’ Here, we should note 
that Plato is craftily inverting what was a well-known verse from a (lost) tragedy by Euripides 
(Melanippe): “The word is not mine, but my mother’s. In Plato’s text the source of the words is 
not the mother, but the father.” Ibid., 95.
10 Ibid., 96.
11 Ibid., 92.
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already rests on a suspension of the insight that (in a strict sense) nothing is 
alike, such identity-proclamations express definitions of relevance, or value.12 
To say that the ‘gynaikes’ are the non-same, excluded others, is to judge them 
less relevant than that which is declared the positive ‘norm’ (here: the male). 
These definitions presume gendered and value-laden dualisms, for example, 
that (ideal) sameness is masculine, and (non-ideal) difference or otherness is 
feminine. Yet, such a gendering of concepts seems problematic and, actually, 
counterintuitive. 
Even if we put these gender-contentions aside, for a moment, what 
remains problematic is the conception of procreation as aiming for sameness, 
rather than allowing for difference. Where Songe-Møller first emphasizes the 
negation of the feminine in her reading, she extends her critique to the implied 
negation of love as interpersonal:
The ideal of love that Diotima is made to advocate is something 
beyond all forms of interpersonal love; it is a love that cannot 
acknowledge and has no need of the Other, and which is unaware 
of differences – especially the differences of sex.13
An identity-philosophy with immortality (truth) as its aim can be attempted 
through companionship of sameness, but can be achieved ultimately only by 
leaving the other behind, standing alone gazing upon beauty.14 Seeing the 
truth means to give birth to many graciously beautiful ideas and theories, 
concludes Diotima on a hopeful note.15 The implications of this parturition 
are serious and, on further reflection, deleterious to individuality. 
ii. The annihilation of difference: The argument for the denial of the 
feminine and of interpersonal love implies more generally the superfluidity 
12 In speech, sameness on the level of statements and identity referring to objects are in 
general characterized by waiving more subtle distinctions which would always be possible, but 
are rarely relevant. In this sense, every topic owes its unity and identity to a kind of double 
negation in a logic of relevance: “Gleichheiten auf der Aussageebene und Identitäten auf der 
objektstufigen Ebene des Besprochenen sind generell durch einen Verzicht auf gewisse feinere 
Unterscheidungen bestimmt, die immer möglich wären, aber selten relevant sind. In diesem 
Sinn ist jeder Redegegenstand in seiner Einheit und Identität über eine Art relevanzlogische 
Negation der Negation bestimmt.” Stekeler-Weithofer, 15. 
13 Songe-Møller, 111.
14 We are reminded of Dante who sees God in Paradiso, only by looking past his guides and 
into the light. 
15 “Do but consider,” she said, “that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful 
through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since 
his contact is not with illusion but with truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has 
reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal.” 
Plato, Symposium, 212a.
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of the individual as individual.16 It is not discourse which shows us truth, 
in Plato’s model, but authority. Plato’s liberating One delivers us from all 
differences.17 It thereby also renders pointless our individual difference – our 
individual opinions, standpoints, our contingent discourses. Vis-à-vis the 
eternal, unchanging truth, all anecdotes of context and fleeting qualities of 
individuality are rendered meaningless. Inside the Platonic cave the prisoners 
have a certain kind of freedom – they have discourse, they talk, they hear 
themselves speaking, their standpoints matter. “As a child of the cave one 
can regard oneself as an individual with a personal – empirical – history; 
as children of the sun we are all the same, impersonal, and quite lacking in 
individual traits.”18 Where sameness is the goal, individuality needs to be 
overcome. 
The parallelism between birth/reproduction and the description of love 
as the movement of philosophy shows humans as striving because they are 
lacking (in wisdom, in immortality), and it shows the eternal as the perfect 
aim of this striving. This conception is motivated by the perception of the 
mortal (impermanent) as lacking, and in need of reproduction. Biological 
reproduction is necessary for one (imperfect) kind of permanence, but needs 
to be overcome to partake of permanence proper. For Plato, seeing beauty, 
that is: Truth, the One, or Eternal Oneness, goes beyond interpersonal love. 
When we behold the eternal, all erotic desire ceases because the eternal itself 
does not know of deficiency or imperfection which are the things that love 
strives to overcome. Understanding the eternally self-identical also means 
delivering a true image of oneself to oneself and thus reaching perfect self-
understanding. The philosopher (who gazes upon truth) no longer desires a 
person who resembles him, but Beauty (Likeness itself) and beyond that: he 
sees Beauty all at once and separated from the path of ‘Eros’ (privation), itself 
16 Songe-Møller, 115. With Luce Irigaray’s reading of the cave-myth as an investigation into 
the foundation of knowledge as reflection, we must observe that the prisoner who leaves the 
darkness of the cave is violently subjected to the reorientation of reason. Although blinded 
and disoriented, according to Irigaray, she soon falls under the intoxication of authority. “In 
order to illustrate what Irigaray regards as the fundamental problem of Platonic philosophy, 
it can be useful to think of the following image: just as the eye is attracted by the source of 
light, namely the sun, that makes it possible for the eye to see, so our soul is attracted by the 
source of all knowledge, namely truth. But the sun is paradoxical in nature. It is not just a 
condition for the eye’s ability to see, it also threatens to destroy the sense of sight. The result 
of staring directly into the sun will be blindness. By analogy, those who open their souls to the 
light of truth without preparation are also in danger of being blinded, or driven to distraction. 
How can we receive the blinding light and the consuming flame of wisdom without risking the 
conflagration of our souls in the process?” 
17 “The ultimate aim of Plato” philosophy is to create the truest possible – meaning the most 
masculine and virginal – images of the form of the Good, or of the Father, as Irigaray calls it. 
Songe-Møller, 126.
18 Ibid., 128.
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not lacking anything. Paradoxically, this categorical separateness places the 
goal of striving outside of the strife. This same paradox we will encounter 
again in Heidegger and in Scheler.
III. Movement in the now towards the future (death): Cura in Heidegger
a. The fable and its context 
The sixth chapter of Sein und Zeit is titled “Die Sorge als Sein des ‘Daseins’” 
(Care as the Being of Existence). The fable of how ‘Cura’ creates the first 
Human Being is given by Hyginus in his Fabulae.19 Heidegger quotes the 
original Latin in its entirety (followed by a German translation) in Chapter 
6, Section 42 of Sein und Zeit. There, Heidegger refers to the fable as a 
‘Bewährung’ (in the sense of validation): “Das im ‘Dasein’ selbst liegende 
Seinsverständnis spricht sich vorontologisch aus.”20 In the fable, the deity 
‘Cura’ (care or Sorge) forms a human figure from clay, then Jupiter (spirit) 
breathes life into it, and Tellus (earth) gives from his body the material for 
the creation. The ensuing custody fight between Care, Jupiter and Tellus 
is arbitered by Saturn (time) who decides that Jupiter and Tellus will get 
back what they loaned upon the death of the new creature which is called 
after the material (humus) from which it was shaped: ‘homo.’ Care shall be 
allowed to keep it as long as it lives.21 
19 Hyginus, Fabulae from The Myths of Hyginus, trans. and ed. Mary Grant (Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 1960), poem 220.
20 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, Band 2, Abteilung 1: Veröffentlichte 
Schriften (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 197. English: “The inherent self-
understanding of being expresses itself pre-ontologically.” (Translation here and in the 
following footnotes mine). 
21 Hyginus, poem 220. The full fable reads as follows: Cura cum fluvium transiret, videt 
cretosum lutum sustulitque cogitabunda atque coepit fingere, dum deliberat quid iam fecisset. 
Jovis interventi, rogat eum Cura ut det spiritum, et facile impetrate. Cui cum vellet Cura nomen 
ex sese ipsa imponere, Jovis prohibuit suumque nomen ei dandum esse dictitat. Dum Cura et 
Jovis disceptant, Tellus surrexit simul suumque nomen esse volt cui corpus praebuerit suum. 
Sumpserunt Saturnum iudicem, is sic aecus iudicat: Tu Jovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte 
spiritum, tuque Tellus, quia dedisti corpus, corpus recipito, Cura enima quia prima finxit, teneat 
quamdiu vixerit. Sed quae nunc de nominee eius vobis controversia est, homo vocetur, quia 
videtur esse factus ex humo. Once when “Care” (a female deity) was crossing a river, she saw 
some clay; she thoughtfully picked up a piece and began to shape it. While she was thinking 
about what she had made, Jupiter came by. “Care” asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly 
granted. But when she wanted to give it her name, Jupiter objected, and demanded that it be 
given his name instead. While “Care” and Jupiter were arguing, Tellus (Earth) stood up and 
wanted his own name to be conferred upon the creature, since he had given it part of his body. 
They asked Saturn (Chronos / Time) to be the judge, and he made the following decision, which 
seemed a just one: “Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its 
death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since ‘Care’ 
first shaped this creature, it shall be hers for as long as it lives. And since you disagree as to its 
name, let it be called ‘homo,’ for it is made out of humus (earth).”
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Sorge, or care, traditionally has a double meaning on which Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the fable rests. In a footnote, Heidegger refers to Burdach’s 
1923 essay ‘Faust und Sorge’ in which Burdach relates Goethe’s reworking 
of a poem by Herder and the double meaning of ‘Sorge.’22 The testimony of 
the fable shows, according to Heidegger, Sorge as the key to understanding 
‘Dasein,’ provided that Sorge is understood in this double sense, not simply 
as “Besorgnis,” “Bekümmernis.” Sorge in this first sense refers to burdens, 
worries or troubles.23 In the second sense, care means “Für-Sorge,” devotion 
or regard. Burdach emphasizes how it is more than effortful striving: Horace 
and Seneca connote concern and solicitude as ‘Bemühung,’ a striving which 
allows humans to perfect themselves towards fulfilling their potential.24 This 
etymological observation (with Burdach) allows Heidegger to incorporate 
Seneca’s interpretation of ‘cura’ as diligence/care, as that which allows man 
to achieve perfection – where divine perfection lies in divine nature and is 
completed ‘naturally,’ man needs ‘cura’ to achieve perfection to fully become 
human: unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius ‘cura,’ hominis.25 
Heidegger can understand the ‘perfectio’ of humans as accomplishment of, 
care, perfection is “das Werden zu dem, was er im Freisein für seine eigensten 
Möglichkeiten (dem Entwurf) sein kann.”26 The fable has a testimonial sense: 
“das Zeugnis soll zeigen dass die existenziale Interpretation keine Erfindung 
ist” (the testimony is intended to show that the existential interpretaion is 
not an invention; translation mine). It shows that the proper understanding of 
22 Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke, Erster Theil, Gedichte (Berlin: G. Hempel, 1879), 18-20. The 
four last stanzas of Herder’s ‘Das Kind der Sorge’: “Saturn sprach: ‘Habet es Alle! / So will‘s 
das hohe Geschick. / Du, der das Leben ihm schenkte, / Nimm, wenn es stirbet, den Geist; // 
Du, Tellus, seine Gebeine; / Denn mehr gehöret Dir nicht. / Dir, seiner Mutter, o Sorge, / Wird 
es im Leben geschenkt. // Du wirst, so lang‘ es nur athmet, / Es nie verlassen, Dein Kind. / Dir 
ähnlich, wird es von Tage / Zu Tage sich mühen ins Grab.’ // Des Schicksals Spruch ist erfüllet, / 
Und Mensch heißt dieses Geschöpf; / Im Leben gehört es der Sorge, / Der Erd‘ im Sterben und 
Gott.” 
23 Virgil, for example, places before the gates of the underworld ultrices curae, vengeful cares. 
We also meet a sinister care in Goethe’s Faust II whose sisters are penury (remember the 
mother of ‘Eros’ in Socrates’ tale), lack and guilt, and whose brother is death. Heidegger makes 
reference to the Greek term μέριμνα, in biblical use with both connotations, (from μερίζω, to 
be drawn in different directions, but also: anxiety of things pertaining to earthly existence and 
care to be taken of), and in the Vulgata as sollicitudo.
24 Unius bonum natura perficit, alterius cura, hominis – the good of the one is completed 
by nature, the good of the other, of human, by care, of human. Ellis, along with other 
English sources, understands this to mean that the aim is the good which the god reaches 
naturally, human only with the help of care; but, as Heidegger points out, what is achieved is 
not “the good,” but perfection in each case. Ellis Dye, “Sorge in Heidegger and in Goethe’s 
Faust,” Goethe Yearbook 16, no. 1 (2009): 208.
25 Heidegger, 264 (quoting Seneca, epistula 124).
26 Ibid. English: “being free for its very own possibilities and becoming that (the projection).”
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being is provided by ‘time’ (Saturn): The pre-ontological Wesensbestimmung 
(essential determination) of humans exhibits ex ante the mode of being which 
governs the temporal worldly progression of human existence (“Die in der 
Fabel ausgedrückte vorontologische Wesensbestimmung des Menschen hat 
sonach im Vorhinein die Seinsart in den Blick genommen, die seinen zeitlichen 
Wandel in der Welt durchherrscht”).27 In the double sense of ‘cura’ (given an 
understanding of the history of the term) and in ‘cura’s’ life-long tenure of 
man (given the fable), we find a key to the essentially dual structure of life as 
a ‘geworfener Entwurf’ (thrown and projected).28 
b. ‘Historicity’ as the self-referential aspect of care
Ellis Dye explores the connection between Sorge in Goethe’s Faust II and 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, indicated by Heidegger’s reference to and close 
reading of Burdach’s “Faust und Sorge.” The guiding question is – as what 
does Sorge show itself to Faust, what is its apophantic (self-indicating) sense 
for Heidegger?29 
When Sorge, and she alone, enters a chamber of Faust’s palace, 
a rite of introduction takes place in which she answers Faust’s 
inquiry: “Wer bist du denn?” with the puzzling words: “Bin 
einmal da” […]. It may have escaped the notice of Faust critics, 
or perhaps seemed to them a negligible lexical coincidence, that 
this answer is a form of the term ‘Dasein,’ which in Heidegger 
means the same thing as personhood, a personhood constituted 
by facticity, i.e. the specific situation into which ‘Dasein’ is 
thrown and which determines the possibilities available to it.30
Sorge declares her identity as: Bin einmal da.31 As allegory, Sorge could be 
what Scheler calls the Innesein, or ‘inward perspective’ of life.32 But, as Dye 
27 Ibid., 263.
28 Or: passive and active, or: habituated or intentional. See Beatrice Kobow, Der Sprung in die 
Sprache oder Denken als-ob (Paderborn: Mentis, 2019). 
29 See Heidegger, 289. Heidegger uses aphophantic in relation to the truth of a statement 
which refers to the uncovering of being; truth points to, lets being be seen (apophansis).
30 Dye, 210.
31 In a privately distributed review of Jaspers’s “Psychologie der Weltanschauungen” (1921), 
Heidegger shows that an ontology of “Da sein” is an ontology of the “Ich bin.” See Dye, 212: 
“Sorge, like her repulsed sisters: Not, Schuld, and Mangel, is clearly an allegory, but what is 
the ontological status of allegory, or of any generic convention? Where does allegory reside 
in the world? If this very dichotomy were not so much in question, Sorge could be said to be 
more inside than outside.”
32 Scheller, 10.
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points out, Heidegger marks as a misconception the idea that we are as selves 
opposed to a world and shows that only this misconception brings us to place 
doubt on the existence of the world; whereas, with Heidegger, we are always 
already in the world. Sorge proclaims herself as that which is da (here), and this 
identification essentially ties Sorge to the real-world indexical coordinates of 
a (lived) life.33 Sorge forces us to face our contingency (given in the indexicals: 
here-now-so), while at the same time forcing us to project ourselves (violently 
outside of these coordinates) towards possibility. For Heidegger, the ‘ancient 
fable’ affirms the situatedness of humans in their existence; he has summarized 
this situatedness as ‘Existenzialität’ (existentiality), ‘Faktizität’ (facticity), 
‘Verfallensein’ (fallenness), a structural unity which is brought into relief by 
‘Angst’ (fear, anxiety).34 
Sorge is shown to have an aspect of futurity and anticipation for both 
Goethe and Heidegger. Someone who worries “Ist der Zukunft nur gewärtig / 
und so wird er niemals fertig” – the ambiguity of possible translations of the 
second verse foreshadows our conclusion: he who is aware only of the future, 
never comes to an end; nor reaches a goal; he remains in flux; is never perfect. 
This describes Faust’s specific character-trait of strife, Heidegger’s idea of 
‘Neugierde’ (curiousity) as ‘Aufenthaltslosigkeit’ (being without resting 
place),35 and corresponds in an interesting way with Plato’s description of 
‘Eros’ as unhoused, without abode, in the very sense of an inner restlessness 
or striving; on the other hand, both ‘cura’ and ‘eros’ are said to be the driving 
force which allows man to achieve his potential. Both conceptions place the 
goal outside of the strife; thus, it must remain out of reach.
In his lectures on Augustine, on which he builds his analysis here, 
Heidegger speculates that in despair itself lies a kernel of hope (for the mercy 
33 See Dye, 213: “The verbal complement “da” also eliminates the possibility that she is simply 
asserting her existence per se – her being as opposed to the possible alternative of non-being – 
and saying, after Descartes, “I am” or after God in the Jewish Bible: “I Am That I Am” (Exodus, 
3:15).”
34 Ibid., referring to Heidegger, Section 41. Dye summarizes: “As Dasein, we are the kind of 
beings who are worried about meaning, entities for whom our being is an issue, so Sorge’s 
answer to Faust: “Bin einmal da,” amounts to her self-representation as an inquisitor of the 
meaning of being, capable of luring the question of the meaning of Dasein out of its hiding 
place, according to Heidegger’s definition of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. On the 
other hand, she lays claim to a contrary capacity to make someone in her power indifferent to 
everything: “Wen ich einmal mir besitze, / Dem ist alle Welt nichts nütze.” (11453-11462) – 
the same power to make “Seiendes” slip away into “Gleichgültigkeit” that Heidegger attributes 
to Angst.”
35 Heidegger, 229: Curiosity, in contrast to Scheler, is not amazed gazing (taumazein), but 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake and constitutes the three aspects of curiosity for him: Non-
dwelling (Unverweilen), distraction (Zerstreuung), Aufenthaltslosigkeit (homelessness).
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of God).36 Care is not only appetite (orexis, or striving), as in Faust’s most 
characteristic trait, but also hope and with it gives an end (or meaning) to the 
striving. Sorge presents herself as the interrogator of the meaning of being 
and attributes to herself the power to negate all differentiations and thus 
all meaning. In Faust II, Faust rejects Sorge and she has to leave. Before she 
goes, she blinds him: “Die Menschen sind im ganzen Leben blind, nun Fauste, 
werde du’s am Ende!”37 His last moments on earth are literally spent blindly, 
blissfully ‘free of care’ – in an inner brightness (‘Allein im Innern leuchtet 
helles Licht’).38 Planning and organizing in the present, Faust states:
Eröffn’ ich Räume vielen Millionen, / Nicht sicher zwar, doch 
tätig-frei zu wohnen […]. Solch ein Gewimmel möchte ich sehn, 
/ Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volke stehn. / Zum Augenblicke 
dürft’ ich sagen: / Verweile doch, du bist so schön! 39 
This very line echoes Faust’s wager with Mephistopheles in Faust I:
Werd’ ich zum Augenblicke sagen, / Verweile doch! du bist so 
schön! / Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen, / Dann will 
ich gern zu Grunde gehn! / Dann mag die Todtenglocke schallen 
[…].40
We might, as audience, perceive this moment of self-deception at the end of 
Faust’s life as tragic – it is the moment in which ‘Faust’ loses who he is by losing 
his strife; more than in his actual death (which follows on his reminiscence as 
an affirmation of the ‘Augenblick’ – “Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück / 
Genieß’ ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick”), Faust’s self-deception is the very 
moment in which ‘Faust,’ prototypical example of human strife, ceases to exist.41 
For Ellis Dye, Heidegger’s self-perception of not having developed an 
adequate relationship with Goethe (as per his letter to Jaspers in 1949 with 
36 Ibid. Heidegger refers to his lecture on Augustine as the basis for his work on Sorge in Footnote 
3, 264: “Die in der vorstehenden existenzialen Analytik des Daseins befolgte Blickrichtung 
auf die Sorge‘ erwuchs dem Verf. im Zusammenhang der Versuche einer Interpretation der 
augustinischen – das heißt griechisch-christlichen – Anthropologie mit Rücksicht auf die 
grunsätzlichen Fundamente, die in der Ontologie des Aristoteles erreicht wurden.”
37 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust II (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1986), 11497-11498.
38 Ibid., 11500.
39 Ibid., 11563-4, 11579-11582. Faust mistakenly takes the creatures, whom Mephistopheles 
commands to dig Faust’s grave, for workers preparing the ground for building Faust’s vision 
of a fertile valley.
40 Ibid., Faust I, 1699-1703.
41 Ibid., Faust II, 11585-11586.
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which Dye opens his essay) and his conceptual unlocking of ‘Dasein’ with 
Sorge, a clue provided by Faust II, is bordering on self-deception:
Indeed, the liquid term ‘influence’ needs to give way to something 
more complex and comprehensive – ‘facticity’ perhaps. We are 
not just suckled by our heritage, we are enveloped and informed 
by it. No single metaphor will do, not even that of sculpting, as 
when ‘cura’ sculpted ‘homo’ out of clay. 42
In the justification of why the fable is given such a central place in the 
discussion of Sorge als Sein des Daseins, the meta-poietic43 importance of 
‘historicity’ in the self-referentiality of ‘Dasein’ becomes clear. This discussion 
also includes the peculiar anti-realism in Heidegger’s treatment of realism in 
relation to Sorge as in §43c: Realität und Sorge, and the inherent paradoxical 
extra-situatedness of the end, here: death, vis-à-vis the striving. Considering 
this point in relation to the ‘cura’-fable puts us in a position to refine our 
response to the criticisms against Plato’s concept of an erotic conatus (in the 
conclusion). Heidegger writes in a 1921 letter to Karl Löwith:
Ich arbeite konkret faktisch aus meinem ‘ich bin’ – aus 
meiner geistigen, überhaupt faktischen Herkunft – Milieu – 
Lebenszusammenhängen, aus dem, was mir von da zugänglich ist 
als lebendige Erfahrung, worin ich lebe […]. 44
The “ich bin” is, like the fable, an expression of ‘Dasein.’ The references to 
a permanence of meaning in Heidegger’s Chapter 6 itself shed light on the 
issue of ‘Dasein’ as self-reflexive through historicity (in canonical meaning, 
42 Dye, 214. See also, ibid., 215: “Goethe is a factor in Heideggers factic ‘ich bin.’” This 
sentence challenges the adequacy of Heidegger’s reading of Dasein qua Sorge.
43 Poiesis – making/creating; Diotima refers to creation beyond mortality – 1) natural poiesis in 
procreation, 2) poiesis in the city through fame, 3) poiesis in the soul through knowledge. For 
Heidegger poiesis is a bringing-forth (a gathering, a fulfilling); meta-poiesis as main purpose of 
human existence, that is: the practice humans need to develop to encounter the modern world 
refraining from the two dangers, nihilism and fanatic participation: “The task of the craftsman 
is not to generate the meaning, but rather to cultivate in himself the skill for discerning the 
meanings that are already there.” Hubert Dreyfus, and Sean Dorrance Kelly, All Things Shining 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 209.
44 The text of this letter of August 19, 1921 can be found in: Zur philosophischen Aktualität 
Heideggers, eds. Dietrich Papenfuss, and Otto Pöggeler (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990). Here, 
I quote it with Dye, 212, who remarks: “This statement, like others in Heidegger, prohibits 
easy distinctions between the self and the non-self. Heidegger’s claim that he works concretely 
and factically out of his “Ich bin” reflects his criticism of Descartes’s sum, which implies the 
separation of the self from its world, without involvement in which there can be no such thing 
as a self.”
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and ultimately: in language).45 This is so even before Heidegger takes us 
back to his verification of the understanding of the meaning of existence 
(Sinn vom Sein) in his analysis of time (in the following chapters). ‘Dasein’ 
is characterized by historicity; it is always in some way ‘understood,’ even 
if the different modi of being are not yet differentiated.46 Most commonly 
this entails the pre-reflected assumption of ‘a world,’ corresponding to the 
modus: fallenness (in which the present inauthentically dominates being and 
all action becomes busy activity, designed to further veil ‘Dasein’; this is 
also the mode in which adhering to conventions (the ‘man’) provides solace; 
being is then seen as the cohering of things (res) – a ‘reality.’47 The basic 
determination of Being is as substantiality. The horizon of an understanding 
of ‘Dasein’ is shifted, it disappears from view because Being now takes on 
this sense of ‘reality.’ With Kant, Heidegger rejects the question whether the 
external world exists. This is not, as with Kant, on account of the world being 
given qua self, but rather vice-versa, the self being given qua world (against 
the assumption that the self could exist in isolation).48 With this argument, 
Heidegger turns equally against realism and idealism. Heidegger writes that 
he seemingly, but quasi doxographically agrees with realism in the assumption 
of the existence of an external world. Yet realism misguidedly assumes this 
existence could be proven; whereas idealism rightfully denies that Being can 
be explained by or reduced to the existence of things, but does not give a 
comprehensive analysis of the ‘res cogitans’ and therefore cannot understand 
how Being can include the existence of an independent non-mental reality. 
This is, of course, possible because of the historicity of ‘Dasein.’49 It is in 
this sense that Heidegger’s insistence on the fable not being an ‘invention’ 
comes to fruition: meanings are never ‘invented,’ ‘set’ or ‘made,’ but always 
revealed through lived circumstance which does not simply mean contingent 
45 Dye quotes Goethe’s words to K. J. L. Iken: “Da sich gar manches unserer Erfahrungen 
nicht rund aussprechen und direkt mitteilen läßt, so habe ich seit langem das Mittel gewählt, 
durch einander gegenüber gestellte und sich gleichsam ineinander abspiegelnde Gebilde den 
geheimeren Sinn dem Aufmerkenden zu offenbaren” (September 1827). Dye, 214. In an 
interview with Bhikku Maha Mani, a Buddhist monk, in 1963-64, Heidegger formulates this 
insight with specific reference to language: “Das Wesen des Menschen ist dadurch bestimmt, 
dass er existiert, indem er dem Sein entspricht.” (The human being is essentially determined as 




49 Death (as that towards which my life is oriented) becomes an end which is doubly external: 
it is external to the striving of my life (Seneca, for example, among other stoic thinkers, denies 
that death is even an event of (my) life) and it is external to its meaning which is constituted 
with reference to past meanings and qua future projections (beyond death, purposefully 
ignoring its possibility). 
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material lives, but life in all of its complexity, including the historical sources 
of meaning, preserved in the canon. 
IV. Movement of ‘Geist’ (deity) through ‘Drang’ (urge): Mensch in Scheler
a. The term ‘Mensch’ as ‘Wesensbegriff’ 
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos contains Scheler’s views on some of the 
main aspects of a philosophical anthropology, a project he had been working 
on since 1922.50 In this inquiry into the essential nature of human beings, Kant’s 
question “Was ist der Mensch?” is examined and the alleged exceptionality of 
humans (‘Sonderstellung’) is put to the test. According to Scheler, “the educated 
European” (standing in for the Western tradition) relates the term ‘Mensch’ back 
to three different traditions: (i) the Jewish-Christian religious teaching of divine 
creation; (ii) the tradition of Greek philosophy in which humans are humans 
qua reason (logos, phronesis, ratio, mens); and (iii) modern natural sciences 
which in a theory of evolution describe humans in continuity with other life-
forms (and might attribute the exceptionality-thesis to a quantitative surplus 
in intelligence and choice-behaviors in humans, or deny it altogether).51 The 
project of Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is to develop a unified and non-
reductivist (non-vitalist) understanding of human beings. He bases his account on 
a ‘Wesensbestimmung’ (essential determination) in which the term ‘Wesen des 
Menschen’ provides the radical starting point for a systematic reading (like the 
myth of ‘Eros’ and the fable of ‘Cura’); on this basis, Scheler can critically reply to 
different reductivist accounts, such as formal-mechanistic theories (for example: 
Democritus, Epicurus, Lamettrie, Hume, Mach) and vitalist reductivisms (such as, 
James, Dewy, Marx and Nietzsche), but also nihilism (Buddha, Schopenhauer), and 
classic dualist (e.g. Descartes) and teleological accounts of ‘Geist’ (e.g. Hegel).
In Scheler’s account, life is characterized by certain ‘objective’ properties, 
such as movement, differentiation, formation, and spatial and temporal 
containment of an individual unit, a ‘self,’ but also by the essential feature that 
there is an inner sense in which this ‘self’ is experiencing life, a basic self-givenness 
(Fürsich-und Innesein).52 This ‘Innesein’ is the basic form of ‘soul’ which even plants 
have. Anorganic matter is lacking a sense of interiority and self-givenness. It is 
the defining feature of life to possess an ontic center, a unique spatio-temporal 
unity which is ‘individuality.’ Plants, animals and humans partake in what Scheler 
50 It is the script of a 1927 lecture which Scheler intended as a precis of a longer text to be 
published in 1929. Scheler died in 1929 and no continuous larger text on a philosophical 
anthropology was published posthumously. 
51 The cura-myth no doubt also echoes in the mind of the reader the Biblical creation story, 
responding to it and altering it in interesting ways.
52 Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Berlin: Michael Holzinger, 2016), 10.
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calls ‘Gefühlsdrang’ – an unconscious, undifferentiated sense of striving, a mere 
object-less ‘towards’ or ‘away.’53 Plants have this sense, yet they do not have 
any feedback of the states of their individuality to a ‘command center’ and 
hence live ecstatically into their situatedness. Like all living beings, plants also 
already exhibit another core feature of life, an expression of their self-givenness, 
indicating a quality of life; for a plant this may be ‘wilted,’ ‘strong,’ ‘abundant,’ 
‘poor’ (matt, kraftvoll, üppig, arm) and it is an answer to the question of how this 
particular individual is doing.54 
Animals are specialized further and have an act-center, feedback of states 
to this center, specific self-movement in reaction to this feedback, associations, 
acquired reflexes, and in addition to expression the communicative ability to 
indicate their states to others. This feedback and modification of the status quo 
constitutes a second degree self-givenness for animals. It does not amount to 
self-consciousness, yet: all of the things that an animal notices and understands 
are contained in its environment. The specific difference of the animal (its urges, 
its perceptual apparatus) forms a closed unit with its environment. Thus, the 
animal lives ecstatically into its environment and cannot separate itself from it 
(neither spatially, nor temporally). In this way, it affirms the environment. 
In contrast, humans can negate their environment. They can distance 
themselves from their environment, transforming it into ‘a world’ forming  a 
symbolic representation of ‘the world.’ Where the interaction between animal 
and environment is closed, the interaction between human and environment is 
open and can be extended indefinitely. ‘World-openness’ is a defining feature 
of human existence. Humans are capable of a self-givenness of the third degree 
(sharing the first level of self-givenness with all life-forms as ‘Gefühlsdrang,’ and 
the second degree with animals as self-awareness): by being able to understand 
contingency in an act of objectification as ‘dingliche Welt’ (world of objects) 
and then applying this act of objectification to their own psycho-physical being 
(Sammlung), they gain self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein). Humans are only 
capable of this third degree self-givenness on account of ‘having spirit.’ “But it 
would be wrong,” writes Scheler, “to assume that we have an additive model, that 
humans have in addition to the other psychic strata: urge (Gefühlsdrang), instinct, 
associative memory, intelligence and choice, just one new level in addition.”55
53 Ibid., 14: “selbst die einfachste Empfindung ist nie bloß Folge eines Reizes, sondern immer 
auch Funktion einer triebhaften Aufmerksamkeit.”
54 Ibid., 13.
55 Ibid., 32: “Ich behaupte: Das Wesen des Menschen und das, was man seine ‘Sonderstellung’ 
nennen kann, steht hoch über dem, was man Intelligenz und Wahlfähigkeit nennt, und würde 
auch nicht erreicht, wenn man sich diese Intelligenz und Wahlfähigkeit quantitativ beliebig, 
ja bis ins Unendliche gesteigert vorstellt. Aber auch das wäre verfehlt, wenn man sich das 
Neue, das den Menschen zum Menschen macht, nur dächte als eine zu den psychischen Stufen 
Gefühlsdrang, Instinkt, assoziatives Gedächtnis, Intelligenz und Wahl noch hinzukommende 
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The Greeks call this principle reason, but Scheler prefers the more encompassing 
term ‘Geist’ which, according to him, includes reason (thinking ideas), intuition 
(Anschauung) and understanding (of values as essential determination), and 
certain volitive and emotional value-acts (such as love, regret, awe, wonder, 
bliss, despair).56 ‘Geist’ constitutes the exceptionality of human beings: Humans 
are guided by spirit (deitas, Geist) which is categorically different from all 
manifestations of life (in that these manifestations are all further specifications 
of ‘Gefühlsdrang’).57 ‘Geist’ is opposed to ‘life’ and allows humans to inhibit 
their urges, distance themselves from their immediate environment and suspend 
an immediate (instinctual, affective, reflexive) psychophysical response to the 
resistance of the environment surrounding the self and experienced with anxiety. 
Through this distancing, humans are capable of transforming environment into 
world and self-awareness into self-consciousness. A third important characteristic 
of ‘Geist’ is its pure actuality. It is only actualized in the free execution of ‘acts’ 
by a ‘person,’ ‘person’ not being a concrete entity (a human being, for example), 
but a continuous organization and essentially determined order: “Die Person ist 
nur in ihren Akten und durch sie.”58 All aspects of soul are implementations of 
‘Gefühlsdrang,’ they are realized ‘in time,’ that is: as a sequence of events and thus 
‘gegenstandsfähig’ (objectifiable), whereas ‘Geist’ itself can neither in ourselves 
nor in another person be understood as objectified, only as that act which allows 
us to objectify the movements of our own soul (Sammlung). Therefore, vis-à-vis 
the being of our own ‘person,’ we can only ‘gather our wits,’ ‘focus towards it,’ 
but not place ourselves at an objectifying distance from it. In the same way, we 
cannot objectify the person of another, but understand it in a spiritual act of 
consummation (Mitvollzug) which is diametrically opposed to objectification. 
b. Beyond biology and time: Cosmological limits of ‘Wesen’
Scheler’s conception of ‘Geist’ is unique in several respects and this is so by 
design. In contrast to the platonic and classical conceptions, Scheler considers 
‘Geist’ to be opposed to the principle of life (inhibiting it); to be itself without 
any force or impetus (vs. classical and theist conceptions); and to be supra-
neue Wesensstufe psychischer, der Vitalsphäre angehöriger Funktionen und Fähigkeiten, die 
zu erkennen also noch in der Kompetenz der Psychologie und Biologie läge […]. Schon die 
Griechen behaupteten ein solches Prinzip und nannten es ‘Vernunft.’ Das Aktzentrum aber, in 
dem Geist innerhalb endlicher Seinssphären erscheint, bezeichnen wir als ‘Person,’ in scharfem 
Unterschied zu allen funktionellen Lebenszentren, die nach innen betrachtet auch ‘seelische 
Zentren’ heißen.”
56 Scheler, 32.
57 Even increasing man’s intelligence and the ability to choose indefinitely (the highest degree 
of specification of Gefühlsdrang) would not capture the specific difference, because it is a 
categorical difference. 
58 Ibid., 40.
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individual and external to human beings (contrary to reductivist assumptions 
which deny anything external to biology). It is, indeed, a cosmological 
conception that he puts forth:
i. A life-inhibiting principle: How is ‘Geist’ enabling the openness to the world 
and the self-conscious self-givenness (of the third degree) of human beings? 
When Scheler thinks about ‘sublimation’ (of vital urges, of excess energy) and 
also about ‘life-denial’ (omne ens est malum),59 he arrives at a conception of 
‘Geist’ as that which negates life by suspending the ‘Gefühlsdrang;’ this entails 
the suspension of sense-perceptions and urges.60 We must conclude that 
anxiety will be overcome in this ‘ascetic’ act of unmaking reality through a 
deactivation of ‘Gefühlsdrang.’ Thus, the effect for human beings is liberating, 
suspending anxiety, extending their reach beyond the closed interaction with 
environment experienced by (non-human) animals (as ‘Welt-offenheit’), and 
presenting everything in the world, including themselves, as subject matter for 
understanding. Human beings as essentially determined by Geist are in this way 
external and superior to the world and their own being as a life form: “So ist der 
Mensch als Geistwesen das sich selbst als Lebewesen und der Welt überlegene 
Wesen.”61
ii. A principle without force? The ‘Geist durch Drang’ – solution:62 In a spectacular 
inversion, Scheler understands all power-relations to be universally bottom-up 
(instead of top-down).63 Most powerful and independent is the anorganic order, 
then, descending from more to less powerful, plant-life, animals, human beings 
(Scheler none-the-less maintains a traditional nomenclature of life-forms 
whereby the further developed are called ‘higher’). Thus, each ‘higher’ life-form 
59 Ibid., 46-47: In actualizing of life-urge, human beings are masters of no-saying, ascetics of 
life (in Buddha’s sense); this holds questions of value and ideology notwithstanding, be it that 
you might propagate a denial of life, deem reality itself as evil, or believe, as Scheler does, 
that there is a balance between Idea-Geist and reality-urge and that the calling of humans is to 
return to reality and their contingent existence (zurück zur Wirklichkeit und ihrem Jetzt-Hier-
So-sein).
60 See Ibid., 46. For Plato, senses and urges belong to one-another, that is why to philosophize 
is to ‘continuously die.’
61 Ibid., 40.
62 We are reminded of the Charioteer-image of the human soul (in Plato’s Phaedrus): two horses 
are pulling a chariot, steered by a charioteer. The obedient horse represents spiritual desires; 
the other horse represents carnal desires and follows its own immediate urges (carnal desire). 
The charioteer is reason. 
63 Ibid., 55: “Der Kräfte-und Wirkstrom, der allein Dasein und zufälliges Soein zu setzen vermag, 
läuft in der Welt, die wir bewohnen, nicht von oben nach unten, sondern von unten nach oben. 
In stolzester Unabhängigkeit steht die anorganische Welt in ihrer Eigengesetzlichkeit da – an 
ganz wenigen Punkten so etwas wie ‘Lebendiges’ enthaltend. In stolzer Unabhängigkeit steht 
Pflanze und Tier dem Menschen gegenüber, wobei das Tier weit mehr vom Dasein der Pflanze 
abhängig ist als umgekehrt […].”
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is vis-à-vis the ‘lower’ life-form relatively powerless and depends on the ‘lower,’ 
yet more powerful life-form for realization.64 In its ‘pure’ form, Geist is without 
all force, power, and activity. Only its working on humans and effecting 
a suspension of urges (indirectly) lends activity and force to it: “Geist und 
Wollen des Menschen kann nie mehr bedeuten, als ‘Leitung’ und ‘Lenkung.’”65 
We are reminded of the charioteer in Plato’s metaphor of the soul which has 
to steer and direct the souls’ powers. The traditional dichotomy body-soul 
is dissolved into the dual principles Geist-Life (as Drang), which, although in 
tension, are developed in accord: Over time, there is as a (necessarily historical) 
development66 an (ever) further realization of spirit through life which is the aim 
and end of finite being and (temporal) events; while a theist account falsely 
places creatio ex nihilo at the beginning of this process, a mistake caused by 
the conception of ‘deitas’ as all-powerful, not all-powerless.67 Both principles, 
‘Geist’ and ‘Leben’ depend on each other, spirit facilitates openness to the world, 
self-consciousness and meaning (understanding of values and ‘Mitvollzug’), life 
animates spirit: “Geist und Leben sind aufeinander hingeordnet.”68 
iii. Supra-individuality and externality of spirit: Scheler’s idea of the realization of 
Geist through life is one of constant becoming and of Geist as supra-individual, 
yet realized in ‘persons.’ Scheler describes the peculiar phenomenon that human 
beings perceive space and time to be ‘empty,’ as existing even without being 
furnished by objects and events; this, he claims, is an effect of the ability to 
‘abstract’ from the concrete environmental, psychophysical contingency:
So blickt der Mensch, ohne es zu ahnen, seine eigene Herzensleere 
als ‘unendliche Leere’ des Raumes und der Zeit an, als ob diese 
auch bestünden, wenn es gar keine Dinge gäbe! 69 
64 Ibid., 56: “Jede höhere Seinsform ist im Verhältnis zu der niedrigeren relativ kraftlos – und 
sie verwirklicht sich nicht durch ihre eigenen Kräfte, sondern durch die Kräfte der niedrigeren.“
65 Ibid., 57. English: Geist and intention of the human being can never mean more than 
‘guidance’ and ‘steering.’
66 Ibid., 44: “Eine ‘konstante’ Vernunftorganisation, wie sie Kant angenommen hat, gibt es 
dabei keineswegs; sie unterliegt vielmehr prinzipiell dem geschichtlichen Wandel. Nur die 
Vernunft selbst als Anlage und Fähigkeit, durch Funktionalisierung neuer Wesenseinsichten […] 
ist konstant.”
67 Ibid., 59: “Die gegenseitige Durchdringung des ursprünglich ohnmächtigen Geistes und 
des ursprünglich dämonischen, d.h. gegenüber allen geistigen Ideen und Werten blinden 
Dranges durch die werdende Ideierung und Vergeistigung der Drangsale […] ist das Ziel und 
Ende endlichen Seins und Geschehens – der Theismus stellt es fälschlicherweise an seinen 
Ausgangspunkt.”
68 Ibid., 73. English: “‘Geist’ and life are organized towards one another in an enabling 
relationship.”
69 Ibid., 39.
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Equally, once having become ‘Welt-exzentrisch’ – standing outside of the 
world, and not being able to perceive themselves as part of the world, leads 
human beings to the question of their own standpoint and, in necessary 
consequence, to the question why there is a world and why they themselves 
are, and not instead nothing.70
Human beings are “‘Mitkämpfer,’ ‘Miterwirker’ der Gottheit”: This does 
not mean that there is a personified God in whose fellowship humans stand 
(as slaves, servants or children), but instead that they are united in bringing 
about ‘Geist’ – this is ‘Mitvollzug’ (across individuals, across historical time 
and contingent place). ‘Mensch’ is thus the seat of ‘Geist’ in that the processes 
of lived life and of the entirety of temporal becoming of the world (“der 
Weltprozeß, den der Geist in Kauf nimmt”) are necessary for any realization 
of ‘Geist.’ At the same time, ‘Geist’ is itself beyond space and time and 
beyond individual human beings, external to them. It is only ‘cutting across’ 
the temporal progression of life: “Die Intentionen des Geistes schneiden 
sozusagen den Zeitablauf des Lebens.” 71 
The cosmological dimension of Scheler’s conception is controversial 
because it entails an understanding of ‘Geist’ (as deitas) as not possessing 
any positive creative power (“so kommt dem, was wir den ‘Geist’ und die 
‘Gottheit’ in diesem Grunde [der oberste Grund des Seins] nennen, keinerlei 
positive schöpferische Macht zu”),72 but insists on this principle as highest 
reason for being and assumes that all temporal events are shaped by it, while 
denying a (historical) teleology, but affirming as aim the self-realization of 
deitas (indirectly) dependent on the processes of temporal becoming.73 The 
human being whose ontic center is the ‘person’ provides the space of the 
realization of ‘Geist.’74 Thus, the spirit is external to the human being, but 
present in its ‘person.’ Scheler insists on this duality, partially, because he 
rejects reductivist accounts. 
A simple move in Scheler’s argument makes it possible for him to 
differentiate his own approach of the ‘conditio humana’ from most other 
accounts (at his time), opens them up to his criticism and allows him to show 
an alternative solution: Separating ‘Geist’ from the sphere of ‘life’ (defined 
70 Ibid., 74. 
71 Ibid., 67. 
72 Ibid., 59.
73 Ibid.: “Der Grund der Dinge musste, wenn er seine deitas, die in ihr angelege Ideen – und 
Wertfülle verwirklichen wollten, den weltschaffenden Drang enthemmen, er musste den 
Weltprozeß sozusagen in Kauf nehmen, um in und durch den zeithaften Ablauf dieses Prozesses 
sein Wesen zu verwirklichen.”
74 Ibid., 77.
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fundamentally by ‘Gefühlsdrang’), and declaring ‘Geist’ to be ‘without force 
per se,’ of working through and on life qua inhibition (Hemmung) of urges, 
instead. 
“Man wird mir sagen und man hat mir in der Tat gesagt, es sei dem 
Menschen nicht möglich, einen unfertigen Gott, einen werdenden Gott 
zu ertragen!”75 Recognizing the erotic movement towards the eternal as 
historically given and interpersonally realized, and ourselves dedicated to it, 
we can reject reductivism and embrace an order of ideas and values beyond 
individual strife and, yet, as its’ end. 
V. Conclusion
At the center of these three exegetic re-considerations stands the 
philosophical wonder at the complexity and meaningfulness of the canon. All 
three philosophical ‘myths’ render the question of a permanence of meaning 
as it poses itself to individual human beings and collectives, and with the 
aim of re-affirming a transcendental (that is, in this sense: non-reductivist) 
conception of the conative. 
I have re-introduced to the reader three descriptions of conative strife 
which go beyond biological existence. In these accounts, the striving 
transcends the here-and-now of the physically given. The goal of striving has 
moved outside or beyond the strife. There are many points of intersection, 
congruence and difference of these positions which merit further inquiry. 
In sum, historicity as a self-reflexive aspect of the conative trumps an 
understanding of the conative strife as limited to biological functioning. 
Let me conclude by pointing out several features shared by all three 
non-naturalist accounts. They show humans wrestling with the question of 
relevance, that is, with the question of how meaning can be permanent while 
being transmitted ‘in time;’ this concerns both individual mortality and the 
permanence of meaning in the collective. The survival of the species (partaking 
of immortality) cannot simply be achieved by psychophysical survival, but by 
sharing of and in ‘immortal ideas.’ The motivation for the (individual’s) strife 
is privation and the fundamental movement of ‘Eros’ is a striving towards 
‘fullness’ (possession) while this goal is categorically different from the strife 
(and thus placed beyond it; it can never be reached). 
The three conative myths provide the starting point for the philosophical 
deliberation on the ‘nature’ of human beings, but they are also the reason 
for philosophizing: ‘Eros,’ as a striving from privation towards knowledge, 
initiates the movement of philosophical love (as path to enlightenment) for 
75 Ibid., 78. English: “I will be told and I have in fact been told that it is impossible for humans 
to bear the thought of an inchoate, a becoming god!”
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Plato. The cura-fable is a testimony of ‘Dasein;’ since ‘ich bin’ for Heidegger 
is the concrete facticity of the lived life and includes ‘geistige Herkunft’ – 
intellectual provenance as a fact, it is the engagement with this fable which 
begins and justifies the elaboration of asking for the meaning of Being (‘die 
Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn vom Sein’).76 For Scheler, an appropriate 
and necessary response to the world-excentricity (der weltexzentrisch 
gewordene Seinskern) of human beings is ‘taumazein,’ philosophical wonder.77 
Plato has Diotima maintain that partaking of real immortality is possible,78 
to look upon essential beauty which is “not infected with the flesh and color of 
humanity;”79 at the same time, she claims that
every mortal thing is preserved in this way: not by keeping it exactly 
the same forever, like the divine, but by replacing what goes off or is 
antiquated with something fresh, in the semblance of the original.80
The reaction to this conundrum of divine immortality as sameness and human 
mortality as becoming is echoed in Heidegger and Scheler as a reaction to Kant’s 
rejection of the questioning of an external world. Scheler writes: 
Der Mensch muss den eigenartigen Zufall, die Kontingenz der 
Tatsache, daß ‘überhaupt Welt ist und nicht vielmehr nichts ist’ 
und ‘daß er selbst ist und nicht vielmehr nicht ist’ mit anschaulicher 
Notwendigkeit in demselben Augenblicke entdecken, wo er sich 
überhaupt der Welt und seiner selbst bewusst geworden ist.81 
The contingency of this fact is grounded (with Heidegger) in the facticity of a 
lived life; and, viewing essential beauty beyond humanity, is, of course, only 
possible from the vantage point of the coordinates of such a life. Yet, grasping 
the world and contingent existence in it takes place from a perspective ‘between 
76 Heidegger, 265. 
77 Scheler, 76.
78 Plato, Symposium, 212a: Do you call it a pitiful life for a man to lead – looking that way, 
observing that vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him? ‘Do but consider,’ she 
said, ‘that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it 
visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion 
but with truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win 
the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal.’
79 Ibid., 211e.
80 Ibid., 208a-b.
81 Scheler, 75. In English: The human being discovers the peculiar coincidence, the contingency of the 
fact “that there is a world at all and not rather nothing” and “that she herself is and not rather not” with 
ostensive necessity in the same moment in which she becomes aware of the world and of herself.
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ignorance and knowledge’ (if we understand ignorance as not being self-aware, at 
all, and knowledge as viewing beauty entirely pure and unalloyed) and in a move 
from privation towards understanding; it is the move of the erotic towards the 
eternal of human conative striving. 
A human being is ‘in a mean between ignorance and knowledge,’ striving 
towards perfection. In this striving she is dedicated to and held by care, which 
directs her towards the future and possibility, but binds her to her contingent 
existence. The engagement with her environment includes not only material 
circumstances, but also the canon by which meaning is transmitted. This is how 
humans are confirmed by one another (Mitvollzug) as ‘persons,’ the act-centers 
of a supra-individual, external, transcending order of values and ideas. This order 
is realized continuously and self-reflexively as a temporal order, as ‘historicity’ by 
individuals in their reflection of Truth (Geist, ‘Dasein’). 
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